{"id":13745,"date":"2026-05-18T07:06:51","date_gmt":"2026-05-18T07:06:51","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/langleyesquire.com\/?p=13745"},"modified":"2026-05-18T07:19:24","modified_gmt":"2026-05-18T07:19:24","slug":"japanese-politics-updates-20260517","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/langleyesquire.com\/ja\/japanese-politics-updates-20260517\/","title":{"rendered":"Japanese Politics Updates – May 17, 2026"},"content":{"rendered":"
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This Week in Japanese History: Echos of Anpo (1960)<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The briefing opened with reflection on the Anpo protests against the revised US-Japan Security Treaty\u2026 66 years ago. Hundreds of thousands surrounded the Diet fearing Japan was becoming too deeply entangled in American Cold War strategy. The unrest extended well beyond the Diet itself, with major university campuses becoming centers of prolonged confrontation. Prime Minister Kishi ultimately forced the treaty through parliament amid extraordinary political turmoil, permanently shaping postwar attitudes toward alliance management, constitutional identity, and fears of external entanglement.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What made the historical reference particularly relevant this week was the degree to which many of the same anxieties still linger beneath current debates surrounding Taiwan, defense normalization, and the future role of the US alliance itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Prime Minister\u2019s Week: Politics, Not Just Policy<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

A major theme this week was not just the Trump\u2013Xi meeting, but Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi\u2019s increasing focus on internal political management inside the LDP.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

After criticism that she had become overly insulated within the Kantei and too narrowly focused on policy execution, the Prime Minister spent much of the week holding factional consultations, lunches, dinners, and political coordination meetings with senior party figures. Friday\u2019s high-profile steak lunch included Taro Aso, Secretary-General Suzuki Shunichi, Hagiuda Koichi, and Kajiyama Hiroshi, with discussions centering on Hormuz, supplemental budgeting, and broader party coordination.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Attention is now turning toward the inaugural gathering of \u201cKokuryoku\u201d (\u201cNational Power\u201d) scheduled for May 21 \u2014 a new pro-Takaichi support group assembled under the guidance of Taro Aso. Importantly, it is not a faction, but rather a support network intended to reinforce the Prime Minister\u2019s political durability inside the LDP.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Particularly noteworthy is the expected participation of US Ambassador George Glass as guest speaker. In Japanese politics, presence itself often carries meaning. Equally revealing are several expected absences: Kono Taro, Hayashi Yoshimasa, and other potential future leadership contenders appear to be maintaining some distance from the emerging Takaichi-Aso alignment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The overall impression this week was that the Prime Minister has begun shifting from governing administratively toward governing politically.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Trump, Xi, and Tokyo\u2019s Anxiety About \u201cG2\u201d<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Tokyo watched President Trump\u2019s Beijing visit carefully.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While the Takaichi government reportedly hoped Trump might stop in Tokyo before traveling to China, the administration instead dispatched Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent to Japan. Trump then called Takaichi directly while still in the region, reaffirming the \u201cunwavering\u201d nature of the US-Japan alliance while discussing Taiwan, Hormuz, and economic security.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Still, concern persists in Tokyo, and similarly in Seoul and Taipei that Washington and Beijing may begin managing regional tensions more directly between themselves.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The deeper concern in Tokyo is less abandonment than marginalization. That concern appears to be accelerating Japan-South Korea coordination. Prime Minister Takaichi will travel to South Korea Tuesday for two days of expanded bilateral discussions as the \u201c2+2\u201d framework continues gaining momentum and producing results.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Yen, Intervention, and the BOJ\u2019s Dilemma<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The yen closed the week at \u00a5158.46 to the dollar, continuing its gradual weakening following the Golden Week interventions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Considerable discussion focused on how Japan finances such interventions. The Ministry of Finance does not simply \u201cprint money\u201d to support the yen. Instead, it sells portions of Japan\u2019s enormous foreign reserve holdings estimated at roughly $1.2 trillion, including US Treasury securities and other foreign-denominated assets accumulated over decades through trade surpluses and export earnings: this last intervention totalled ~US$10 billion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The objective appears less about restoring the yen to previous levels than preventing excessive volatility and avoiding a psychologically damaging breach beyond \u00a5160.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Meanwhile:<\/p>\n\n\n\n